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WRONGFUL DISCHARGE-SEXUAL HARASSMENT EQUATED
WITH PROSTITUTION To FIND PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION, Lucas v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
Beverly Lucas, an employee of Brown & Root, Inc., was dis-
charged on January 15, 1981.1 Lucas subsequently filed suit against
Brown & Root in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Arkansas.2 She contended the discharge was the direct result of
her refusal to sleep with her foreman. On April 7, 1983, the district
court dismissed the claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections
19833 and 19854 and granted the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint
to include claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
Plaintiff's second amended complaint contained, inter alia, an explana-
I. Beverly Lucas was employed at the Brown & Root, Inc. construction site in Newark,
Arkansas.
2. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., No. 83-1923 (E.D. Ark. final order filed May I1, 1983).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979 and Supp. 1984). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: Every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,' custom, or usage . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
. . . shall be liable to the party injured ....
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1979 and Supp. 1984) provides in part: [I]f one or more persons en-
gaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation ....
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Section 703(a) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (I) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. at § 2000e - 2(a). Section 701 of Title VII sets out applicable definitions to the Act at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e. Brown & Root objected to the proposed amendment on the ground that Lucas
failed to file a timely Title VII action. Title VII requires that suit be filed within ninety days of
receipt of the right-to-sue notice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 5(f) which states:
If a charge filed with the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section is dismissed by the Commission or if within one hundred
and eighty days from the filing of such charge . . . the Commission, has not filed a civil
action . . . the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety
days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respon-
dent named in the charge ....
See also Harper v. Burgess, 701 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1983). Specifically, defendant asserted that
Beverly Lucas had personally acknowledged receiving a right-to-sue notice from the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ninety-one days prior to the filing of the initial complaint. It is
interesting to note that Lucas' first attempt to bring an action under Title VII occurred nearly five
months beyond the statutory time limitations.
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tion for the untimely filing of the Title VII action.' In addition, plain-
tiff asserted claims for wrongful discharge and for intentional infliction
of emotional distress under Arkansas law.7 The district court dismissed
all claims. 8 An appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit ensued.9
The court of appeals agreed with the lower court that the plain-
tiffs Title VII claim was time barred.10 However, the court reversed
and remanded with respect to the state law claims," finding that a
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine was recog-
nized in Arkansas. 2 The decision to remand was based on the findings
that the
[clomplaint alleging that plaintiff was fired because she would not
sleep with her foreman stated both a contract and a tort claim under
Arkansas law; and . . . [the] complaint alleging that sexual advances
were made placing plaintiff's job on the line and that her employer
made misrepresentations with respect to plaintiff's unemployment
compensation stated [a] cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Arkansas law.'"
Lucas v. Brown & Root, 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
At common law, an employment relationship could be terminated
at the will of either the employer or the employee when there was no
contractual provision that either required continued employment or set
forth a covered duration of employment.14 Even though this rule some-
times operated harshly, few legal principles have been as well-settled as
the broad rule that employment for an indefinite term is regarded as
employment-at-will. 1 The employment-at-will rule provided that em-
ployment for an indefinite period could be terminated at any time by
either party for any reason or for no reason at all. 6
6. Lucas, No. 83-1923 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
10. Id. at 1203.
II. Id.
12. Id. at 1204.
13. Id. at 1203.
14. Murg and Scharman, Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23
B.C.L. REV. 329, 334-335 (1982).
15. No federal or state statute had been enacted as of 1982 which would override the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine. Experts estimate that between seventy and seventy-five million Ameri-
can workers are unprotected from the harshness of the rule. I I I LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23,




Employment-at-will evolved from the presumption adhered to by
English courts that a hiring would be for one year if no time limit was
expressed or implied by custom." English courts imposed liability upon
employers who discharged employees without good cause at any time
during the year. 8 Early American cases appear to support the view
that the English rule was adopted by the colonies. 9 These cases reflect
that American courts had no difficulty fixing a term of employment
where proof of custom,2 0 trade usage,21 or an understanding between
the parties2 2 was present. However, decisional conflicts resulted where
such factors were not present. 3
These conflicts were the by-product of changing economic times
which required new and better rules to govern the employment rela-
tionship. First, the industrial revolution brought about a more imper-
sonal employment relationship. 4 Employers began to abandon pater-
nalistic feelings toward employees nurtured by the feudal master-
servant filiation.25 Second, a contract theory developed by the courts
during this period conditioned the employer's duty tonot terminate at-
will upon a firm promise clearly expressing an intent to be held to the
terms of the agreement. 26 Finally, in an effort to resolve conflicting
court decisions and to meet the changing needs of an industrialized
society, American courts began to presume that a hiring for an indefi-
nite period was terminable at-will.27
This presumption became known as the employment-at-will rule,
often referred to as the "Wood Rule" for the attorney who first stated
the doctrine. 28 In an exhaustive study of the law of the master-servant
relationship, H.G. Wood professed that "a general or indefinite hiring
17. Murg and Scharman, supra note 14, at 332.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891) (presumption that
continuance after expiration of one year contract is general hiring for one year); Douglas v.
Merchants' Ins. Co., 118 N.Y. 484, 23 N.E. 806 (1890) (presumption that employee's continu-
ance of employment after end of specified annual contract is with same terms); Bascon v. Shillito,
37 Ohio 431 (1882) (English presumption for one year to be inferred from general hiring).
20. Hobbs v. Davis, 30 Ga. 423 (1858).
21. Roddy v. McGetrick, 49 Ala. 159 (1873).
22. Smith v. Theobald, 86 Ky. 141, 5 S.W. 394 (1887).
23. Compare Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857) (indefinite hiring is hiring for one year)
with Kirk v. Hartmant Co., 63 Pa. 97 (1869) (law does not imply a hiring for one year).
24. Murg and Scharman, supra note 14, at 334.
25. Id.
26. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Termi-
nate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1825 (1980).
27. Id.
28. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1st ed. 1877).
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is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof."29 De-
spite the contention that the cases cited by Wood failed to support his
proposition, the courts quickly adopted his formulation of the rule.3"
Many of the early decisions cited Wood alone as authority, and one
cited no authority at all, finding that the cases adhering to the rule
were too numerous to justify citation.3'
The American rule "permitted an employer to discharge an em-
ployee for good cause, no cause or even for bad cause." 3 An employee
could only be protected by a contract providing for a definite term of
employment. Thus, in a broad sense, the rule relied upon formalistic
contract theories. Under this approach, manifestations of intent must
be evidenced by definite, express terms if promises are to be enforcea-
ble.33 Therefore, if the parties intended the employment relationship to
last for one year, the employment contract would have to expressly pro-
vide for this to make the provision enforceable at law.
The case most frequently cited in support of the employment-at-
will rule is Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R.14 This case, like many of the
early decisions, refused to interfere in the nature of the employment
contract, thus creating a presumption in favor of allowing termination
at any time.35 The American rule, as developed through case law,
placed the burden of proof on the employee to establish that the parties
intended to create employment for a definite term. 6 Under the English
rule the employer had borne the heavier burden of proving an intent
between the parties to create an employment term of less than one
29. Id. at 272.
30. For a discussion of those cases, see Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974); see also Annot., II A.L.R. 469, 476-77 (1921).
31. Harrod v. Wineman, 146 Iowa 718, 125 N.W. 812 (1910).
32. Murg and Scharman, supra note 14, at 335.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958); see also 9 S. WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 1017 (3d Ed. 1967).
34. 82 Tenn. 507 (1884). In Payne the court stated:
[Mien must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to
discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad
cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an
employee may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want
of cause as the employer.
Id. at 518-19, overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134
(1915). See also Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 554,
112 P. 886, 888 (1910).
35. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.




For nearly a century, the employment-at-will doctrine has re-
mained virtually unchanged. Absent a federal statute or a collective
bargaining agreement containing provisions to the contrary, most states
apply the rule in its original form; termination is the sole prerogative of
the employer.38 Courts in some states, however, have permitted excep-
tions to the application of the rule.
Generally, exceptions are permitted in two situations: 1) where
"public policy" is violated by the discharge and 2) where implied con-
tracts are violated by the discharge.39 The public policy exception is
best exemplified by a 1959 California case, Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396.40 The Petermann decision held
that an employer did not have the right to discharge an employee who
refused the employer's order to commit perjury. The California court,
after finding perjury to be against the state's declared public policy,
proclaimed "the civil law, too, must deny the employer his generally
unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment is for an
unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the em-
ployee's refusal to commit perjury." '41
Another area in which attempts are made to erode the common
law rule is that of "implied contracts". Courts applying this exception
generally hold as a matter of law that employment contracts include an
implied right of good faith and fair dealing.42 Thus, where a discharge
of an employee is found to have been motivated by bad faith, a cause of
action for breach of contract is allowed."3
Arkansas, declining to recognize either of these exceptions, has al-
ways followed the employment-at-will rule in its original formulation.
37. Note, supra note 26, at 1825-26.
38. Id.
39. 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 7 (Nov. 22, 1982).
40. 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
41. Id., 344 P.2d at 31.
42. See Rees v. Bank Bldg. and Equip. Corp., 332 F.2d 548, 551-52 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 101, 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1255-56 (1977).
43. The rationale behind this theory is the protection of earned employee benefits. See Cole-
man v. Graybar Electric Co., 195 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1952) (The court recognized an employer's
obligation to not deprive an at-will employee of his previously earned commissions by discharging
the employee without good cause); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251 (1977) (Court held that a termination not made in good faith would constitute a breach of
contract. The jury was instructed to determine the employer's real motive in terminating the em-
ployee and if the reason for discharge was to avoid payment of a bonus then the termination was
in bad faith).
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In Miller v. Missouri Pacific Transportation Co.,44 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court clearly stated its position: "where no definite term of em-
ployment is specified the employment may be terminated at the will of
either party in the absence of other circumstances controlling the dura-
tion of employment. "4 5 The Arkansas courts have consistently applied
the employment-at-will rule for nearly a century.46 The Supreme Court
of Arkansas recently reaffirmed its adherence to the employment-at-
will doctrine stating "[iut is quite clear, therefore, that in the absence
of some alteration of the basic employment relationship, an employee
for an indefinite term is subject to dismissal at any time without
cause."
47
In 1980, the Arkansas Supreme Court departed from its firm
stance and indicated that in the proper circumstances an action for
wrongful discharge would be allowed under the public policy exception
to employment-at-will. 48 But the court failed to find an action for
wrongful discharge in subsequent decisions.40
Despite the indecision of the Arkansas Supreme Court, Lucas v.
Brown & Root, Inc.59 held that in Arkansas the public policy exception
to the employment-at-will rule may give rise to a cause of action for
wrongful discharge. 51 The Eighth Circuit refrained from making a spe-
cific finding of wrongful discharge but reversed and remanded to the
district court for further consideration in light of the court's opinion. 5
44. 225 Ark. 475, 283 S.W.2d 158 (1955).
45. Id. at 481, 283 S.W.2d at 161.
46. See. e.g., Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 518 F. Supp. 694 (D.C. Ark. 1981), aff'd, 683
F.2d 285 (1982); Gilbreath v. East Arkansas Planning and Development Dist., Inc., 471 F. Supp.
912 (E.D. Ark. 1979); French v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 285 Ark. 332, 686 S.W.2d 435 (1985);
Gaulden v. Emerson Electric Co., 284 Ark. 149, 680 S.W.2d 92 (1984); St. Louis I.M. and S.R.
Co. v. Matthews, 64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W. 902 (1897).
47. Griffen v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433, 642 S.W.2d 308 (1982). Justice Hays, writing for the
court went on to state: "We cite these cases to illustrate how firmly ingrained in our case law is
the rule that either party may terminate a contract of employment where no specific duration is
agreed on even when the contract requires cause." Id. at 311.
48. M.B.M. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980) (court rejected implied just
cause standard for termination, but indicated a public policy exception to the employment-at-will
rule might be appropriate in the proper circumstances). But cf Newton v. Brown & Root, Inc.,
280 Ark. 337, 658 S.W.2d 370 (1983) (court contends that it was unable to decide in Counce if it
would recognize a public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule).
49. French v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 285 Ark. 332, 686 S.W.2d 435 (1985); Gaulden v. Emer-
son Electric Co., 284 Ark. 149, 680 S.W.2d 92 (1984); Newton v. Brown & Root, Inc., 280 Ark.
337, 658 S.W.2d 370 (1983).
50. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 1204.
52. Id. at 1207. The plaintiff, Beverly Lucas, took a nonsuit on November 5, 1984.
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Judge Arnold, speaking for the three member panel,53 summarily
dismissed the plaintiff's Title VII claim as time barred. The remainder
of the court's opinion was divided into two issues: 1) wrongful dis-
charge and 2) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Addressing the wrongful discharge claim first, the court briefly
outlined the development of the employment-at-will doctrine. Citing
several law review articles54 as authority, Judge Arnold noted that a
steady trend was developing toward allowing a public policy exception
to the rule. Even though no Arkansas case has held a discharge to be in
violation of public policy, the Eighth Circuit observed that the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court had indicated a willingness to recognize a public
policy exception to at-will employment.5 5 Specifically, the court relied
upon M.B.M. Co. v. Counce,"6 in which the plaintiff's claim of wrong-
ful discharge was denied. The Arkansas Supreme Court stated in dicta
in that case: "We might well agree with Ms. Counce if there was any
indication that she was discharged for exercising a statutory right, or
for performing a duty required of her by law, or that the reason for the
discharge was in violation of some other well established public pol-
icy."' 57 The court concluded that two propositions had been established
by Arkansas Supreme Court decisions:
1) that employees whose contracts are not for a fixed term may ordi-
narily be discharged, just as they may quit, for any reason or for no
reason; and 2) that there are exceptions to this, rule, coming into play
when the reason alleged to be the basis for a discharge is so repugnant
to the general good as to deserve the label 'against public policy'.58
The court defined "against public policy" as something forbidden
by either the legislature or the courts.59 The use of "public policy" by
the Arkansas Supreme Court was characterized as falling in the latter
category.60 After examining the public policy of Arkansas both retro-
spectively and prospectively, Judge Arnold found that the shared moral
53. The two remaining members of the panel hearing the case were Judge Gibson and Judge
Bowman.
54. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1204. See generally Blades, Employment At Will v. Individual Free-
dom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967);
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only
in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980)
55. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1204.
56. 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
57. Id. at 273, 596 S.W.2d at 683.
58. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1204-05.




values of the people reflected that the plaintiff's claim for wrongful dis-
charge should state a cause of action."1 Analogizing the facts at hand
to prostitution he declared "[iut is at once apparent that the shoe fits. A
woman invited to trade herself for a job is in effect being asked to
become a prostitute. ' 62 Indeed it is clear that prostitution, made illegal
by statute,63 is against public policy.
Although it could be argued that a job is not a "fee" within the
meaning of the statute, the court refuted the merits of this argument
by pointing out that in a civil proceeding, such as the one at hand, the
statute need not be strictly construed."
Judge Arnold expressed concern that an individual should not be
punished for refusing to commit a crime, and thus a cause of action is
well founded where this is proven.6 5 A cause of action for wrongful
discharge according to this theory is based upon breach of contract,6
"[flor it is an implied term of every contract of employment that
neither party be required to do what the law forbids. ' 67 Thus, an em-
ployer who discharges an employee for refusing to do what is clearly
prohibited is in violation of a duty imposed by law upon all employers
to implement the public policy of the state.
The second issue dealt with by the court was plaintiffs claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Judge Arnold articulated
plaintiff's burden of proof as follows: "To avoid summary dismissal
facts must be pleaded which support the prima facie elements ....
Appellants' allegations, accepted as true, must show (1) extreme and
outrageous conduct, (2) willfully or wantonly performed, (3) which
caused severe emotional distress." 68 Extreme and outrageous conduct
was defined by the court as "conduct that is so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency . 69 The Eighth Circuit
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3002(l) (Supp. 1983) provides: A person commits prostitution if
in return for or in expectation of a fee he engages in or agrees or offers to engage in sexual
activity with any other person.
64. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1205.
65. Id. In addition to proving that she was discharged for refusing to commit a crime, Lucas
must also prove that Brown & Root was responsible for it. "If, for example, Brown & Root took
steps to correct the allegedly offending foreman within a reasonable time, it would not be responsi-
ble for his conduct." 736 F.2d at 1205 n.3.
66. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1205.
67. Id.
68. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1206 (citing Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288, 1290 (8th Cir. 1981).
69. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1206 (citing M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark.
at 280, 596 S.W.2d at 687).
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placed emphasis not on just the acts done by the employer, but even
more importantly upon the employer's abuse of the relationship with an
employee which gives him the power to damage the employee's inter-
est. 70 Thus, Judge Arnold referred specifically to the defendant's power
over the employment relationship as enough to justify the claim. 7' Lu-
cas' allegations of sexual advances and misrepresentations made by the
employer with respect to her unemployment compensation were held to
state a cause of action. However, no mention of plaintiff's chances for
success on the merits was made. Accordingly, the burden of proof re-
quired by the courts to make out a prima facie case must be met before
the plaintiff can recover.
Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc.73 is significant for several reasons.
First, the opinion reaches well beyond the bounds of any Arkansas case
decided prior to Lucas. A careful analysis of recent case law leads to
the conclusions that Arkansas has yet to recognize a public policy ex-
ception to at-will employment.74 Second, Judge Arnold relies entirely
on non-Arkansas precedent for the proposition that an implied conve-
nant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in every employment
contract.75 Finally, the court gave limited consideration to Arkansas'
70. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1206 (citing M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681
(1980).
71. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1206.
72. Id.
73. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
74. See Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (district
court refused to recognize public policy exception stating "it is a wave which has yet to reach
Arkansas." Id. at 494); Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984) (Arkan-
sas Supreme Court refused to recognize public policy exception on a demurrer to the complaint
for lack of sufficient facts); Newton v. Brown & Root, Inc., 280 Ark. 337, 658 S.W.2d 370 (1983)
(Arkansas Supreme Court refused to recognize public policy exception where employee contrib-
uted to unsafe working conditions); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980)
(Arkansas Supreme Court refused to recognize public policy exception on the facts presented).
75. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1204. Judge Arnold relied on case law from California, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire and New Jersey to support the trend toward recognizing a public policy
exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will. See Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local
396, 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (against public policy to terminate an employee for
refusing to commit perjury despite the existence of the employment-at-will rule); Fortune v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (every employment contract
contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; thus, a discharge in bad faith consti-
tutes breach of contract); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (a
bad faith termination constitutes breach of contract); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84
N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (a termination which violates clear mandate of public policy consti-
tutes an action for wrongful discharge). In addition, the court of appeals relied on California law
alone to uphold its conclusion that every employment contract contains an implied term forbidding
either party from being required to commit an act forbidden by law. Lucas, 736 at 1205; see
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.2d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
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strong adherence to the doctrine of employment-at-will. Judge Arnold
bypassed the decisions of the Arkansas courts which state a strong posi-
tion in favor of the viability of the employment-at-will rule in the
state. 6
The Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed its position on the at-will
rule in Griffin v. Erickson77 wherein the court stated: "It is quite clear,
therefore, that in the absence of some alteration of the basic employ-
ment relationship, an employee for an indefinite term is subject to dis-
missal at any time without cause. '7'8 Arguably, the Griffin decision did
not involve a cause of action based on the public policy exception, how-
ever, other Arkansas cases decided both before and after Griffin have
faced the public policy exception and rejected it.79 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas dealt with the issue
by holding, "[tihus, while reversing the 'at-will' presumption may be
the wave of the future, it is a wave which has yet to reach Arkansas." 80
Arkansas seems to recognize this "inevitable" trend but has been
careful not to leap into the fray without due consideration of its past
stand on the issue. The Supreme Court of Arkansas, for instance, after
stating in dicta in Counce"t that it might recognize an action for
wrongful discharge in the appropriate circumstances, backtracked from
that broad proposition in Newton v. Brown & Root, Inc.8" Chief Justice
Adkisson, writing for the court, refused to find that Counce was the
definitive authority for Arkansas adopting the public policy exception.83
Instead, the Chief Justice stated, "[tihere [in Counce] we were unable
to decide if we would recognize such an exception .. ..*"" Indeed,
Counce is not the definitive authority sanctioning the public policy ex-
ception. Just two days before the decision in Lucas was handed down,
the Arkansas Supreme Court again rejected an opportunity to adopt
the exception.85
Thus, while the courts of Arkansas are aware of the trend toward
eroding the doctrine of employment-at-will, they have avoided every
76. Griffin, 277 Ark. 433, 642 S.W.2d 308 (1982).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 437, 642 S.W.2d at 310.
79. Supra, note 74.
80. Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 487, 494 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
81. 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
82. 280 Ark. 337, 658 S.W.2d 370 (1983).
83. Id. at 339, 658 S.W.2d at 373.
84. Id.
85. Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984) (The Arkansas Supreme
Court stated in regard to the public policy exception that it was unwilling to dispose of such an
important issue on what amounted to a demurrer to a complaint).
[Vol. 8:49
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opportunity to adopt an exception to the rule. It is clear that a public
policy exception is necessary in a growing, changing economic society.8 6
However, it is not clear that a federal court of appeals sitting in diver-
sity jurisdiction may impose common law upon a state, regardless of
the social need for it.
Under Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins,87 a federal court must follow
state substantive law in a diversity case. It is not the obligation or duty
of a federal court to predict the future of Arkansas laws. This limita-
tion on federal courts was recognized by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Loucks v. Star City Glass Co. 8' The Seventh Circuit re-
fused to impose its perceptions of the law on the state of Illinois stat-
ing, "We sit as a court, not as a legislature; it is not our province as a
federal appellate court to fashion for Illinois what we are certain many
would say was a wise and progressive social policy."' 9
In stark contrast, the Eighth Circuit has taken the position that it
sits as a super legislature dictating what "we think [the law] will be
declared by that Court [the Supreme Court of Arkansas] in the fu-
ture." 90 The panel clearly formulated new state law for Arkansas sup-
porting its position by relying upon dicta. Dicta is both insufficient and
improper to use to predict future state legal developments. As one ap-
pellate court noted in deciding the controlling law: "Dicta alone, while
entitled to consideration, is not of itself an authoritative expression of
the law of the state." 91 The Eighth Circuit has staunchly adopted this
doctrine stating, "[T]he responsibility of the federal courts, in matters
of local law, is not to formulate the legal mind of the state, but merely
to ascertain and apply it.""2 The Lucas panel has gone beyond simply
ascertaining state law and has formulated common law for Arkansas.
This bit of judicial activism has left the law of Arkansas unsettled with
few guidelines for litigating a wrongful discharge claim.
If Arkansas courts rely on Lucas as authority for adopting the
86. Comment, Wrongful Discharge of Employees Terminable at Will - A New Theory of
Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L. REv. 729, 744 (1981) (quoting Blades, supra note 54, at 1404).
87. 304 U.S. 54 (1938).
88. 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977). Loucks specifically claimed he was discharged for expres-
sing his intention to file a Workmen's Compensation claim. The Illinois Worker's Compensation
Act at the time of the action was silent on the question of a retaliatory discharge. Moreover, no
Illinois appellate court had specifically addressed this question. Plaintiff referred the court to a
lower state court decision which found a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. After reviewing
the plaintiff's contentions, the district court dismissed Louck's complaint. Id.
89. Id. at 746
90. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1205.
91. Estate of Goldstein v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 479 F.2d 813, 816 (10th Cir. 1973).
92. Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir. 1941).
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public policy exception, there is still difficulty in defining "public pol-
icy." The panel stretched the rationale used in other states that have
developed the exception. Generally, other jurisdictions have applied the
exception where a state statute reflecting the public policy of the area
directly related to the alleged public policy violation. In contrast, the
authors of the Lucas opinion, without any argument of this nature hav-
ing ever been raised by plaintiff's counsel, equated the plaintiff's claim
of discharge for refusal to engage in sexual relations to prostitution. Is
it not more realistic that the legislature in passing the prostitution law,
intended to prohibit commercial sex? 93 Thus, the public policy, as evi-
denced by the statute, is not directly related to the facts before the
court.
In conclusion, it must be noted that the Eighth Circuit's decision
to "jump the gun" and determine the law for the State of Arkansas is
not a decision that will open a Pandora's box of evils. However, it is
reasonable to presume that Arkansas' firm adherence to the doctrine of
employment-at-will has yet to be conclusively abrogated.
Kim Vance
93. In the Commentary following the Prostitution Statute (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3002(1)
(Supp. 1983)) it is noted that '[T]he 'fee' requirement assures that only commercialized sex will
be penalized."
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